This paper analyzes three popular models of nominal price and wage frictions to determine which best …ts post-war U.S. data. We construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model and use maximum likelihood to estimate each model's parameters. Because previous research …nds that the conduct of monetary policy and the behavior of in ‡ation changed in the early 1980s, we examine two distinct sample periods. Using a Bayesian, pseudo-odds measure as a means for comparison, a sticky price and wage model with dynamic indexation best …ts the data in the early-sample period, whereas either a sticky price and wage model with static indexation or a sticky information model best …ts the data in the late-sample period. Our results suggest that price-and wage-setting behavior may be sensitive to changes in the monetary policy regime. If true, the evaluation of alternative monetary policy rules may be even more complicated than previously believed. JEL Classi…cation: C51; E31; E32; E52.
Introduction

Motivation and Main Results
Economists have recently had considerable success constructing and estimating dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models that are competitive with vector autoregressive (VAR) models in their ability to match macroeconomic data. 1 Because they are grounded in utility and pro…t maximization, DSGE models are potentially robust to changes in the conduct of policy, which is a feature that makes them attractive to policy analysts. This robustness assumes that the utility and pro…t maximization problems underlying the DSGE model are correctly speci…ed [Del Negro et al. (2007) ]. In this paper, we present evidence that the price-and wage-setting assumptions embedded in many DSGE models that are used for macroeconomic policy analysis are too restrictive. Speci…cally, the data suggest that past changes in the economic and policy environment have led to shifts in price-and wage-setting behavior that many DSGE models fail to capture.
DSGE models require a mix of nominal and real rigidities in order to generate realistic impulse responses and autocorrelations. 2 Although the presence of real frictions is fairly noncontroversial, the existence and speci…c form of nominal frictions has generated much debate. Motivated by the "menu costs" literature, early DSGE models held prices …xed between discrete price readjustment opportunities. In pursuit of plausible qualitative and quantitative results, however, many researchers have now dropped that assumption. Instead, these researchers assume that all prices change every period, but not every price is reoptimized each period. In a sticky price and wage framework, prices and wages which are not reoptimized increase automatically by the steady-state price and wage in ‡ation rates (static indexation) or by the lagged price and wage in ‡ation rates (dynamic indexation), respectively. In the "sticky information" approach, …rms and households choose price and wage paths in advance and follow those paths until the next optimization opportunity.
Each of these price-adjustment mechanisms is appealing under certain circumstances. Adjusting by a constant default in ‡ation rate is reasonable in a stablein ‡ation environment; indexing to lagged aggregate in ‡ation is a plausible strategy when in ‡ation movements are unpredictable and highly persistent; while presetting price and wage paths is appealing when in ‡ation is volatile but predictable. This line of reasoning suggests that changes in the conduct of monetary policy and/or changes to the stochastic processes of exogenous disturbances might alter the method in which prices and wages are set. DSGE models, however, typically do not allow for shifts in price-and wage-setting behavior. As a result, these models may be nothing more than local approximations which are reliable only in a speci…c economic environment.
We examine the robustness of alternative DSGE models by comparing their per-formance across an early and a late sample period. We break our sample in the early 1980s because numerous studies …nd that important changes in the conduct and transmission of monetary policy and in the behavior of in ‡ation and output occurred during that period. For example, McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) identify 1984:Q1 as the beginning of a period of reduced variability in output growth, while Du¤y and Engle-Warnick (2006) identify 1979:Q3 and 1980:Q3 as the most likely dates for a major shift in the conduct of monetary policy. Not coincidently, the Federal Reserve signi…cantly changed its operating procedure in the fall of 1979, and the Monetary Control Act of 1980 began a phase-out of interest rate ceilings and other …nancial regulations. As for in ‡ation, empirical studies …nd its persistence and variability began to decline in late 1981 or in early 1982 [Piger (2008) ]. Based on our own Quandt-Andrews test results, applied to GDP in ‡ation, we use 1981:Q3 as the dividing line between early and late samples in our estimations. 3 That date coincides with the beginning of a recession which many economists believe was deliberately induced to lower in ‡ation. The summer of 1981 was also when President Reagan …red striking air-tra¢ c controllers, signaling a new resistance to union wage demands. 4 Maximum likelihood is utilized to estimate our DSGE models over each subsample. Three di¤erent DSGE models are considered: a sticky price and wage model with static indexation, a sticky price and wage model with dynamic indexation, and a sticky information model. After estimation, we use a Bayesian-motivated, pseudoodds measure to judge which model …ts the data best. Early-sample results strongly favor the sticky price and wage model with dynamic indexation over both the sticky information and the sticky prices and wages with static indexation models. In the late sample, however, sticky information and static indexation are competitive with one another, and dominate dynamic indexation. Thus, a shift in price-and wage-setting behavior appears occurred in the early 1980s in response to the pronounced changes in the economic environment at that time. The change is in the direction that one would expect given the reduced persistence and greater predictability of in ‡ation in the late sample.
Relationship to the Existing Literature
Sticky information models are time consuming to estimate because they contain a large number of state variables. As a result, only a few studies-notably, Andre, Lopez-Salido, and Nelson (2005) and Laforte (2007)-compare the empirical performance of sticky price and sticky information frictions in an estimated DSGE model. Our analysis di¤ers from these papers in two key respects. First, we estimate our models over both early and late sample periods rather than only a late sample pe-riod. 5 Splitting the sample allows us to explore the endogeneity of nominal rigidities. Second, our models include nominal wage rigidities in addition to price rigidities. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) argue that including wage rigidities "is crucial for [a] model's performance."The …ndings from both papers, nonetheless, are generally consistent with our late-sample results. Speci…cally, Andre, Lopez-Salido, and Nelson (2005) argue that sticky information dominates sticky prices with dynamic indexation, while Laforte (2007) …nds that sticky information performs about as well as sticky prices with static indexation, and that both models do better than sticky prices with dynamic indexation. One di¤erence with our paper is that our sticky information and static indexation models are competitive with VAR models in the late sample, whereas Laforte (2007) …nds that a VAR model …ts the data best.
Other papers that have compared sticky price and sticky information frictions across multiple estimation periods include Ireland (2001) Kiley (2007) claims that the dynamic indexation model …ts the data slightly better than either the sticky information model or the static indexation model. One potential explanation for the di¤erent result is that we estimate a DSGE model, whereas Kiley (2007) estimates a model comprised of a structural-pricing equation and three reduced-form equations. Reduced-form models are less vulnerable to mis- 5 speci…cation than DSGE models, but they are also estimated less e¢ ciently.
Finally, Ireland (2001) estimates a DSGE model with sticky prices over both early and late sample periods (the sample breakpoint is 1979:Q2). Ireland (2007) , like us, …nds evidence of instability across samples. The instability, however, is in the household's discount factor and not in the pricing equation.
Outline
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our empirical analysis of the persistence and predictability of in ‡ation. Section 3 outlines the DSGE model, including the di¤erent speci…cations of price and wage rigidities. Section 4 discusses our estimation procedure. Section 5 presents the parameter estimates for each model and the pseudo-odds measure used to assess which model best …ts the data. Section 6 examines the variance decompositions and impulse response functions for each model. Finally, Section 7 summarizes our main …ndings and o¤ers suggestions for future research.
The Behavior of In ‡ation
This section examines the degree of persistence and predictability of in ‡ation and whether the observed aggregate in ‡ation process exhibits a break. Changes in the behavior of aggregate in ‡ation and in ‡ation expectations are important because they may re ‡ect changes in how …rms adjust their prices both when given an opportunity to reoptimize and between such opportunities. To determine the most likely date for a break in the in ‡ation process, we use the Quandt-Andrews test. Our results suggest that a break occurred in the second or third quarter of 1981. Using that breakpoint, we …nd that in ‡ation is more persistent and more variable in the early-sample period, and less persistent and more stable in the late-sample period.
Approximating the In ‡ation Process
The price-setting mechanism chosen by …rms may be in ‡uenced by the behavior of aggregate in ‡ation. In a sticky price model with static indexation, …rms increase their prices at the steady-state in ‡ation rate between reoptimizations. That arrangement is most likely to be attractive when in ‡ation remains fairly constant and any deviations from that constant are not very persistent. Similarly, …rms raise their prices automatically by last period's in ‡ation rate between reoptimizations in a sticky price model with dynamic indexation. The dynamic indexation approach is presumably most appealing when the in ‡ation process approximates a random walk. Our task now is to compare the empirical performance of these two price-setting speci…cations and determine whether their relative performance has shifted. We are not necessarily concerned with …nding the best characterization of in ‡ation's behavior. 8 To determine whether the in ‡ation process is better approximated by a transitory variation around a constant or by a random walk, we regress the h-period change in in ‡ation on the constant steady-state in ‡ation rate and the h-period lagged in ‡ation rate:
where is the steady-state in ‡ation rate and 0 1 1. The in ‡ation process in (1) is estimated, separately, for in ‡ation lags ranging from one to four periods. The in ‡ation process is more strongly mean reverting when 1 approaches 1, whereas in ‡ation is closer to a random walk when 1 approximates 0. The timing of shifts in 1 is determined using the Quandt-Andrews test.
Results from the Quandt-Andrews test are presented in Panel A of Table 1 . That test shows a clear break in the in ‡ation relationship at 1981:Q3 for lags of 3 and 4 quarters. The most likely breakpoint at the 2-quarter lag is 1981:Q2, but that test statistic is not quite signi…cant at the 5% level. Finally, there is no evidence of an in ‡ation break in the 1-quarter-lag speci…cation. 9 Panel B of Table 1 displays the estimation results for (1) over the pre-1981:Q3 and post-1981:Q2 subsamples, with standard errors for the estimated coe¢ cients in parentheses. The adjusted R 2 statistics range from 5% to 6% in the early sample and from 19% to 55% in the late sample. Estimates of 1 always di¤er signi…cantly from both 0 and 1, but are consistently two to three times larger in the late sample than in the early sample. Those larger estimates for 1 indicate that in ‡ation is far less persistent in the late-sample period. That result suggests that the in ‡ation environment may have become more favorable for static indexation, relative to dynamic indexation, in the late sample.
Forecasting Changes in In ‡ation
In the sticky information framework, …rms preset a price path between each reoptimization opportunity. That style of price setting will tend to be more advantageous than static indexation whenever in ‡ation movements are large but predictable. The comparison of sticky information with dynamic indexation is more complex. Sticky information allows …rms to adjust prices in response to a wide variety of information. However, the information set is updated infrequently. Dynamic indexation, in contrast, restricts that response to a single piece of information (lagged in ‡ation), but that information is only 1-period old. Dynamic indexation will tend to be more appealing when lagged in ‡ation captures most of the relevant information for forecasting current in ‡ation.
Accordingly, we regress the 1-quarter change in in ‡ation onto the h-quarter lagged median in ‡ation forecast from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SP F t h ( t )) less the 1-quarter lagged in ‡ation rate:
for h = 1, 2, 3, and 4. 10 An estimate of 1 close to 1 indicates that substantial information beyond lagged in ‡ation is helpful in predicting current in ‡ation. Such a result would tend to support sticky information. If, on the other hand, 1 is estimated close to 0, then lagged in ‡ation approximates current in ‡ation well, which would be a more favorable environment for dynamic indexation.
The Quandt-Andrews test is utilized to determine if evidence exists of a shift in Table 2 shows that the Quandt-Andrews test statistics are insignificant at all horizons, which means that there is no statistical evidence of a shift in 1 . Therefore, we have no a priori grounds for suspecting a shift away from an environment favorable to dynamic indexation and toward an environment favorable to sticky information, or vice versa.
Panel B of Table 2 displays the estimation results from the pre-1981:Q3 and post-1981:Q2 samples. Because the Quandt-Andrews test statistics are insigni…cant, it is not surprising that the estimates for 1 are similar in the two samples. As h decreases, predicted in ‡ation provides better information on current in ‡ation, the standard errors for 1 decline, and the adjusted R 2 statistic rises. With the exception of h = 4 in the early sample, the hypothesis that 1 = 0 is rejected. These results suggest that the SPF median in ‡ation forecast has useful information beyond that of the 1-quarter lagged in ‡ation rate. Finally, the 1-quarter lag of in ‡ation has marginal predictive power beyond the SPF forecast even at the shortest horizons, suggesting that the SPF forecasts are ine¢ cient. Table 3 presents the summary statistics for the SPF median in ‡ation forecasts at various horizons over both sample periods. These statistics reveal that expected in ‡ation is lower and is much less variable in the late sample than in the early sample. The average expected in ‡ation rate also is nearly constant across horizons in the latesample period. Expected in ‡ation averages a 3:0% annualized rate at a 1-quarter forecast horizon, which is similar to the 3:3% expected in ‡ation rate at a 4-quarter horizon. In the early sample, in contrast, longer-term forecasts generally call for a lower in ‡ation rate than near-term forecasts. Speci…cally, the average in ‡ation forecast is a 6:3% annualized rate at the 1-quarter horizon, versus a 5:5% rate at a 4-quarter horizon. The lower variability and ‡atter pro…le of in ‡ation forecasts after 1981 suggest that static indexation might have become more appealing relative to sticky information.
Summary and Observations
In ‡ation movements appear to have become less persistent sometime around the middle of 1981. Such a reduction in persistence might have encouraged …rms to utilize static indexation instead of dynamic indexation between price reoptimizations. In ‡ation expectations also seem to have become more stable after 1981, which further supports the argument in favor of a shift toward static indexation.
Other researchers have also documented shifts in the behavior of in ‡ation and in ‡ation expectations. Evans and Wachtel (1993) estimate a Markov-switching model of the in ‡ation process and …nd that in ‡ation follows a random walk between the late 1960s and early 1980s. The innovations to the random walk have a large variance and this, combined with regime uncertainty, produces high in ‡ation-forecast uncertainty. The combination of high in ‡ation persistence and forecast uncertainty during the period should favor dynamic indexation. Cogley and Sargent (2005) analyze in ‡ation dynamics using a VAR model estimated with time-varying coe¢ cients and stochastic volatilities. They …nd that core in ‡ation trends upward between the early 1960s and 1980, falls sharply in 1981, and remains low and reasonably stable thereafter. In ‡ation persistence follows a similar pattern. Therefore, both smaller disturbances to exogenous variables and a shift in the conduct of monetary policy contribute to the change in in ‡ation's behavior in the 1980s. Finally, Piger (2008) considers Bayesian Model Averaging across a wide variety of speci…cations of the in ‡ation process. He …nds evidence of a sharp fall in in ‡ation persistence and in ‡ation uncertainty at the beginning of 1982.
In summary, some combination of changes in monetary policy and changes in exogenous shock processes signi…cantly transformed the behavior of aggregate in ‡ation sometime in the early 1980s. That shift potentially altered pricing incentives at the …rm level. To investigate this possibility, we estimate our DSGE models over distinct early and late samples.
The Models
We use a conventional dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model in which households set wages in a monopolistically competitive labor market and …rms set prices in a monopolistically competitive goods market. Nominal rigidities, however, slow the adjustment of wages and prices. This section outlines the three alternative types of nominal wage and price rigidities which we will empirically evaluate. In particular, we consider a sticky price and sticky wage model with static indexation, a sticky price and sticky wage model with dynamic indexation, and a sticky information model of price and wage setting. The models include exogenous processes representing an aggregate demand shock, a technology shock, and a monetary policy shock and are estimated with data on output, in ‡ation, and the nominal interest rate.
Households
The household sector comprises a continuum of households, h 2 [0; 1], which are monopolistically competitive suppliers of labor. Speci…cally, household h is an in…nitelylived agent who prefers to purchase consumption goods, c t , and hold real money balances, M t =P t , but dislikes working, n h;t . The preferences of household h are represented by the following expected utility function:
where E t is the expectational operator at time t, is the personal discount factor with a value between 0 and 1, b is the internal habit persistence in consumption parameter and is also between 0 and 1, M and n are the nonnegative parameters on real money balances and labor supply, respectively, and is the inverse of the labor supply elasticity with respect to the real wage. The preference variable, a t , represents an aggregate demand shock which evolves in the following manner: ln(a t ) = a ln(a t 1 ) + " a;t , where 1 < a < 1 and " a;t is normally distributed with a standard deviation of a . 11 Although household h has pricing power in the labor market, nominal wage frictions prevent it from either optimally setting a new wage every period or updating the information used to set that wage. Nominal wage frictions also cause the labor supply and the wage rate to di¤er among households. To maintain the tractability of the model, we assume that households participate in a state-contingent securities market guaranteeing each household the same income, so that all of the households make identical decisions on their remaining choice variables. 12 Household h begins each period with its nominal money balances, M t 1 , carried over from last period and the principle plus interest on its current bond holdings, R t 1 B t 1 , where R t is the gross nominal interest rate between periods t and t + 1 and B t is the nominal bond holdings. Labor earnings, W h;t n h;t , and capital rental income, P t q t k t , are received by household h during period t, where W h;t is the nominal wage rate earned by household h, q t is the real rental rate of capital, P t is the price level, and k t is the capital stock. Additionally, household h receives dividends, D t , from its ownership interest in the …rms, a transfer, T t , from the monetary authority, and a payment, A h;t , from its participation in the state-contingent securities market. Those assets are utilized to purchase consumption and investment goods and to …nance endof-period money and bond holdings. The ‡ow of funds for household h is described by the following budget constraint:
Investment purchases, i t , in (4) are converted into capital according to the equation:
where is the depreciation rate. The functional form '( ) in (5) represents the capital adjustment costs associated with the conversion of investment to capital. Because the resources lost in the conversion, i t '(i t =k t )k t , are assumed to be increasing and convex, the functional form '( ) is increasing and concave with respect to the steady-state, investment-to-capital ratio, i=k (i.e., ' 0 ( ) > 0, ' 00 ( ) < 0). Household h is a monopolistically competitive supplier of di¤erentiated labor services, n h;t , to the …rms. The labor services provided by all of the households are combined according to Dixit and Stiglitz's (1977) aggregation technique to calculate total aggregate labor hours, n t :
, where W is the wage elasticity of demand for n h;t . The demand by …rms for household h's labor services is a decreasing function of household h's relative wage:
where W t is interpreted as the aggregate nominal wage:
.
Nominal Wage Frictions
We examine the e¤ects of three popular models of wage setting: sticky wages with static indexation, sticky wages with dynamic indexation, and sticky information wages.
In both of the sticky wage speci…cations, household h is provided periodically with an opportunity to negotiate a new nominal wage contract. The di¤erence between static and dynamic indexation is in how household h's nominal wage adjusts in the absence of an opportunity to renegotiate. In the static indexation speci…cation, households, who are unable to renegotiate, raise their nominal wage by the steady-state in ‡ation rate, whereas in the dynamic indexation speci…cation, households increase their nominal wage by last period's in ‡ation rate. 13 Finally, the sticky information friction enables household h to select a new nominal wage every period, but the information used to set that wage updates infrequently. Sticky Wages with Static Indexation: This friction, as in Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), assumes that households set their wage according to a Calvo (1983) model of random adjustment. Speci…cally, a household has a probability of W that it will receive an opportunity to optimally reset its nominal wage. If that opportunity is absent, then that household's wage automatically rises by the steady-state in ‡ation rate, . A household which has an opportunity to optimally reset its nominal wage selects a nominal wage, W t , that maximizes the present value of its current and expected future utility, (3), subject to its budget constraint, (4), the …rms'demand for its labor, (6) , and the probability, (1 W ) j , that another wage-resetting opportunity will not occur in the subsequent j periods. The solution to household h's wage-setting problem yields the following …rst-order condition:
where U c;t is the marginal utility of consumption and U n(h);t is the marginal utility of labor for household h. On the right-hand side of (7), the value U n(h);t =U c;t is interpreted as the marginal rate of substitution of consumption for labor and " w =(" w 1) is the steady state mark-up of the real wage over the marginal rate of substitution. The absence of an h in the marginal utility of consumption re ‡ects the fact that the state-contingent securities market equalizes consumption (but not labor) among households.
Sticky Wages with Dynamic Indexation: The sticky wage speci…cation with dynamic indexation, like that of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) , is similar to the model with static indexation, except that the nominal wage for nonadjusting households automatically rises by last period's in ‡ation rate. Speci…cally, the probability that a household can negotiate a new nominal wage is w , whereas the probability that its wage increases by last period's in ‡ation rate, t 1 , is (1 w ). The …rst-order condition for the wage-adjusting household with dynamic indexation is as follows:
such that t = 1 and t+j = t+j 1 t+j 1 for j 1. Sticky Information Wages: The …nal nominal wage friction to be examined is sticky information as in Koenig (1996 Koenig ( , 1999 Koenig ( , 2000 . In that speci…cation, household h can set a new nominal wage every period, but the information used to set that wage updates infrequently. Formally, household h acquires new information with a probability of w , whereas it must utilize the information that it obtained j periods ago with a probability of (1 w ). The objective of household h then is to maximize its current expected utility, (3), subject to its budget constraint, (4), and the …rms' demand for its labor, (6) , given that its expectations were last updated j periods ago. Because wages adjust every period but information is sticky, household h's …rst-order condition indicates that the optimal nominal wage, W h;t , is equal to the expected value from j periods ago of the nominal value of the marginal rate of substitution multiplied by the steady-state wage mark-up:
Firms
Firms are entities owned by the households which produce di¤erentiated goods in a monopolistically competitive market, but encounter price frictions that interfere with optimal price adjustment. Firm f hires labor, n f;t , at a real wage rate of w t and rents capital, k f;t , at a real rental rate of q t . Those labor and capital inputs and the level of technology, Z t , are utilized by …rm f to produce its output, y f;t , according to a Cobb-Douglas production function:
where 0 1. The technology variable, Z t , evolves such that
where Z is the steady state value of Z t , 1 < Z < 1, and " Z;t is normally distributed with a standard deviation of Z . As a pro…t-maximizing agent, …rm f minimizes its production costs subject to (8) . The resulting labor and capital factor demands equal:
where t is the Lagrange multiplier from the cost minimization problem and is interpreted as the real marginal cost of producing an additional unit of output. The real marginal cost then can be determined by combining (9) and (10):
Because the real wage, real rental rate of capital, and the level of technology are economy-wide variables, the real marginal cost is the same across all …rms. Aggregate output, y t , is a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) continuum of di¤erentiated goods, y f;t , where f 2 [0; 1] such that
where " p is the price elasticity of demand for y f;t . Cost minimization by the households generates the following demand equation for …rm f 's good:
where P f;t is the price for y f;t and P t is a nonlinear aggregate price index:
Price Frictions
In much the same way as we examined the households' wage-setting behavior, we investigate three popular types of price frictions: sticky prices with static indexation, sticky prices with dynamic indexation, and sticky information prices. Both sticky price speci…cations assume that a random fraction of …rms can adjust their prices in any given period. The remaining …rms must increase their prices by the steady-state in ‡ation rate in the static indexation speci…cation and by last period's in ‡ation rate in the dynamic indexation speci…cation. In the sticky information case, prices are ‡exible, but …rms intermittently update the information used to set those prices.
Sticky Prices with Static Indexation: As in Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), price-setting behavior follows a Calvo (1983) model of random adjustment. That is, the probability that a …rm can optimally adjust its price is P ; otherwise, its price increases by the steady-state in ‡ation rate, . Those …rms which are able to optimally reset select a price, P 0;t , which maximizes its present value of current and expected future pro…ts subject to its factor demand equations, (9) and (10), households'demand for its goods, (11) , and the probability, (1 P ) j , that another price-adjustment opportunity will not occur in the subsequent j periods. Firm f 's e¢ ciency condition when it selects a new price is
where t represents the households'marginal utility of an additional dollar of pro…ts (i.e., t = U c;t ).
Sticky Prices with Dynamic Indexation: Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans' (2005) technique of dynamic indexation in a Calvo (1983) pricing model requires nonprice-adjusting …rms to raise their prices by last period's in ‡ation rate. Formally, a …rm has the probability P that it will be able to select a new price and the probability (1 P ) that its price rises by last period's in ‡ation rate, t 1 . The …rst-order condition for a price-adjusting …rm in a sticky price speci…cation with dynamic indexation is
such that t = 1 and t+j = t+j 1 t+j 1 for j 1. Sticky Information Prices: Sticky information in price setting, as in Koenig (1996 Koenig ( , 1999 , Reis (2002, 2007) , and Keen (2007) , assumes that all prices can adjust every period, but that the information used by …rms to set those prices adjusts infrequently. In particular, …rm f 's information set either updates with a probability of P or remains unchanged from j periods ago with a probability of (1 P ). Using its expectations formed j periods ago, …rm f sets a price which maximizes its expected pro…ts subject to its factor demand equations, (9) and (10), and households'demand for its goods, (11) . Firm f 's …rst-order condition indicates that it selects a price, P f;t , based on expectations formed j periods ago of its nominal marginal cost in period t multiplied by the steady-state price mark-up:
Monetary Authority
The monetary authority utilizes a generalized Taylor (1993) nominal interest rate rule which incorporates both a Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) style smoothing of the nominal interest rate and an endogenous policy response to the output growth rate, g y t = y t =y t 1 , as in Ireland (2004 Ireland ( , 2007 and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2009) . Speci…cally, the nominal interest rate responds to deviations of the lagged nominal interest rate, the current in ‡ation rate, and the current output growth rate from their respective steady states:
where the variables without time subscripts are steady-state values, 0 R 1, > 0, and y > 0. The disturbance term, v R;t , is a transitory monetary policy shock which follows an autoregressive process:
where 1 < R < 1 and " R;t is normally distributed with a standard deviation of R .
Equilibrium and Estimation Procedure
The di¤erent styles of nominal wage and price rigidities are incorporated into the following three DSGE models: a sticky price and sticky wage model with static indexation, a sticky price and sticky wage model with dynamic indexation, and a sticky information model of price and wage setting. Each model's respective equations from the households, …rms, and monetary authority sectors form a set of equations describing the systematic equilibrium of that model. Because each model includes a positive steady-state rate of in ‡ation, the nominal variables, P t , P f;t , W t , W t , W h;t , A h;t , T t , M t , B t , and D t are divided by P t to induce stationarity and thus, each model is able to converge to its nonstochastic steady-state equilibrium. 14 The system of equations for each model is then log-linearized around its nonstochastic steady state. The rational expectations solution can be obtained for both the sticky price and sticky wage models by utilizing traditional solution methods, such as Blanchard and Kahn (1980), Watson (1998, 2002) , or Sims (2002) . As for the sticky information model, the presence of lagged expectations greatly expands the size of the model in the traditional solutions framework. That problem often forces researchers to limit the number of lagged expectations equations and as a result, potentially changes the dynamics of the model. We circumvent that problem by using Wang and Wen's (2006) method of undetermined coe¢ cients to …nd the sticky information model's rational expectations solution. The model size in Wang and Wen's (2006) solution framework, however, expands proportionally with the number of exogenous disturbances, which exponentially increases the time it takes to generate a solution. Given that constraint, we limit the number of exogenous disturbances in our models to three.
The rational expectations solution for each model is transformed into the following state space system:
where Y t is a vector of observed variables, s t is a vector of observed and unobserved variables, " t is a vector of innovations, and M and are matrices containing the underlying parameters of the model. Each variable included in the vectors s t and Y t is speci…ed as that variable's logarithmic deviation from its steady state. Output, the in ‡ation rate, and the nominal interest rate are the observed variables in Y t , while " t comprises the three exogenous shocks, " a;t , " Z;t , and " R;t . The number of observed variables in Y t is set equal to the number of disturbances in " t to eliminate the need for any measurement error in (13) . 15 Finally, our speci…cation of the exogenous shocks results in " t being normally distributed with a diagonal covariance matrix E[" t " 0 t ] = . The state-space representation of the model solution, (12) and (13), is convenient for calculating the likelihood function via the Kalman …lter. The Kalman …lter generates the optimal linear projections of the observed variables, Y tjt 1 , from (13) based on • Y t 1 (Y t 1 ; :::; Y 1 ). The assumption that " t and the initial state s 1 are Gaussian means that the distribution of Y t conditional on • Y t 1 can be speci…ed as follows:
That result enables us to generate the sample log-likelihood function conditional on s 1 :
where is a vector of the parameters contained in , M, and . 16 Those parameters then are estimated by numerically maximizing (14) with respect to . Our model is estimated using U.S. data on output, in ‡ation, and the nominal interest rate from 1954:Q3-2006:Q4. Output is expressed in per capita terms by dividing the chain-weight measure of gross domestic product by the civilian, noninstitutional population, age 16 and over. To eliminate the long-run growth component, the output series is linearly detrended by its average quarterly growth rate over the estimated sample period. 17 The in ‡ation rate is calculated as the rate of change in the gross domestic product implicit price de ‡ator. Finally, the e¤ective federal funds rate is our measure of the nominal interest rate.
Estimation Results and Performance Comparisons 5.1 Estimating the Models
The absence of information on investment, capital, employment, and wages means that some parameters remain either unidenti…ed or weakly identi…ed. Those parameters then need to be set prior to estimating the model. Speci…cally, the lack of investment and capital data makes it di¢ cult to estimate capital's share of output, , the depreciation rate, , and the size of the capital adjustment costs. Capital's share of output is assumed to be 0:33, whereas the depreciation rate is set to a quarterly rate of 2:5%. Our rational expectations solution method does not require an exact functional form for the capital adjustment costs, '(i t =k t ). Instead, we only need to specify parameter values for ', ' 0 , and ' 00 . We set ' equal to the steady-state investment-to-capital ratio, i=k, and ' 0 equal to 1, so that the average and marginal capital adjustment costs around the steady state are zero. To be consistent with Chirinko's (1993) empirical estimates, the remaining capital adjustment costs parameter ' 00 is parameterized so that the elasticity of the investment-to-capital ratio with respect to Tobin's q, [ (i=k)' 00 =' 0 ] 1 , equals 1.
In a similar way, the absence of labor market data compels us to calibrate certain parameters in the utility function. The elasticity of the labor supply with respect to the real wage, 1= , is parameterized to Christiano and Eichenbaum's (1992) estimate of 5, whereas the preference parameter n is set so that steady-state labor equals 0:2. It is unnecessary, however, to specify or estimate a value for the preference parameter M , because it only enters the money demand equation, which is easily dropped from our model. We initially assume that households do not exhibit habit persistence in consumption (b = 0), but later in the paper we discuss how including habit persistence impacts our results. Finally, the lack of wage data makes identifying the price mark-up, the wage mark-up, and the probability of nominal wage reoptimization di¢ cult. We set both the price elasticity of demand, P , and the wage elasticity of labor demand, W , to 6, which is consistent with Erceg, Henderson, and Levin's (2000) assumption that price and wage mark-ups average 20%. The probability that household h can optimally adjust its nominal wage, w , is set to 0:25, which implies that household h, on average, optimally resets its nominal wage once a year.
All three of our models are estimated via maximum likelihood over an earlysample period (1954:Q3-1981:Q2) and a late-sample period (1981:Q3-2006:Q4). As mentioned earlier, it is not uncommon for models to be estimated either over a split sample or over a sample that begins in the late 1970s or early 1980s. Late sample start dates have ranged from 1979:Q3 (when the Fed started manipulating non-borrowed reserves, with an eye toward achieving money-growth targets) to 1983:Q1 (when the Fed began adjusting borrowed reserves in response to changes in in ‡ation and slack) to 1984:Q1 (the start of the "Great Moderation"in real GDP growth). 18 Within each sample period, we follow Ireland's (2004 Ireland's ( , 2007 practice of …xing the parameter values of Z, , and to insure that the steady-state values of output, the in ‡ation rate, and the nominal interest rate match their respective average values in the data. Ireland (2004) argues that such an approach "guards against the possibility that otherwise, the estimated model will attempt to account for systematic deviations of the observed variables from their steady-state levels by overstating the persistence of the exogenous shocks."As a result, we set z = 1041:72, = 1:0108, and = 0:9972 in the early sample and z = 1494:68, = 1:0069, and = 0:9921 in the late sample. The remaining ten parameters: p , R , , y , Z , a , R , Z , a , and R are estimated for our models over both sample periods. 19 Tables 4-6 display the maximum-likelihood parameter estimates and standard errors for our three structural models. 20 The estimated coe¢ cients of the sticky price and wage model with static indexation, as shown in Table 4 , are broadly similar across sample periods, with a few exceptions. The variances of the technology, aggregate demand, and monetary policy shocks are estimated to be substantially higher in the early sample than in the late sample, which is consistent with Cogley and Sargent (2005) . Preference shocks are slightly more persistent in the early sample, whereas technology shocks are somewhat less persistent. Prices are also estimated to be reoptimized, on average, approximately once every 10 quarters in the early sample, compared to roughly once every 4 quarters in the late sample.
Parameter estimates for the sticky price and wage model with dynamic indexation are presented in Table 5 . As in the static indexation model, the variances of the technology, aggregate demand, and monetary policy shocks are higher and the preference shock exhibits more persistence during the early period. The estimated frequency with which prices are reoptimized remains essentially the same in both sample periods. The parameter estimates also suggest that the dynamic indexation model displays extreme interest-rate smoothing ( R = 1) in the early sample, which is consistent with Ireland's (2007) monetary policy rule. One peculiar result in the dynamic indexation model is that technology shocks are essentially white noise, whereas in the static indexation model they are highly persistent. Table 6 presents the parameter estimates for the sticky information model. The estimated frequency of price reoptimization is roughly once every 7 quarters, on average, in both sample periods. Monetary policy seems to be more activist in the early sample. In fact, the estimated coe¢ cients on in ‡ation and output growth are nearly equal, which implies that the Fed was responding to the growth rate of nomi-nal GDP. Aggregate demand shocks are slightly more persistent and the technology shocks somewhat less persistent in the early sample than in the late sample. Finally, the variances of our three exogenous shocks are all larger in the early period, which is consistent with both the static and dynamic indexation models.
Performance Comparison
We utilize the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) to compare the …t of our three estimated models to each other and to VAR models with lags of between 1 and 4 quarters. 21 The BIC for model i is calculated by penalizing its log-likelihood value, L(i), by the number of estimated parameters, N P (i), and the sample size of the data, T , such that
The BIC statistic then is used to calculate a Bayesian-style, pseudo-odds measure which generates a data-determined probability of model i:
where z is the number of models examined. As the value of (i) rises, the likelihood that the data is generated by model i rather than one of the alternative models increases. Table 7 displays the BIC and pseudo-odds measure for the three structural models and the four VAR models. 22 Panels A and B present results for the early-sample period and the late-sample period, respectively. The …rst pseudo-odds calculation compares the static indexation and sticky information models, whereas the second comparison also includes the VAR models. All three structural models are compared in the third calculation, while the entire set of models are simultaneously compared in the fourth computation.
The results from our pseudo-odds measure di¤er greatly across our two sample periods. In the early sample, the sticky information model clearly …ts the data better than the static indexation model and all of the VAR models. When the dynamic indexation model is included, however, virtually all of the pseudo-odds weight shifts to that model. In the late sample, the pseudo-odds weights for the static indexation and the sticky information models are roughly 3/5 and 2/5, respectively. That result suggests that the data slightly prefer the static indexation model in the late sample. When the VAR models are included, the static indexation model tracks the data 21 Brock, Durlauf, and West (2003) and Kiley (2007) also utilize the BIC for model comparison in a non-Bayesian framework. 22 The VAR model used is X t = A(L)X t 1 + e t , where X t = [y t ; t ; R t ] T . slightly better than the best-…tting VAR model, whereas the sticky information model performs slightly worse. Those results do not change when the dynamic indexation model is included in the analysis. Our …ndings from the pseudo-odds measure are broadly consistent with the results reported in Tables 1 and 3 . That is, aggregate in ‡ation is much less persistent after 1981:Q2, which suggests that the in ‡ation environment in our late sample might be more favorable to static indexation, relative to dynamic indexation. We also …nd that the SPF in ‡ation expectations are more stable in the late sample than in the early sample. That result implies that static indexation might be relatively more appealing than sticky information in the late-sample period.
Robustness Check
This section brie ‡y describes the robustness of the results reported in Table 7 to our wage-setting and habit-persistence assumptions. Speci…cally, we consider the impact of both ‡exible wages ( w = 1) and internal habit persistence in consumption (b = 0:25 and b = 0:95) on our three structural models. 23 Without presenting all of the details, we note that relaxing our wage-setting and habit-persistence assumptions does not change our main results. That is, the dynamic indexation model …ts the data best in the early sample, whereas the static indexation models …ts best in the late sample. Our structural models, in most cases, perform slightly better with nominal wage rigidities, as opposed to ‡exible wages, but that result is usually statistically insigni…cant. This …nding is consistent with our conjecture that w is weakly identi…ed given that our observed variables are output, in ‡ation, and the nominal interest rate. As for the degree of habit persistence, we …nd that the data prefer speci…cations with little or no habit persistence (b = 0:25 or b = 0). The lack of data on consumption, however, makes it di¢ cult to precisely identify the degree of habit persistence.
6 Empirical Implications Tables 8, 9 , and 10 show the forecast-error variance decompositions for output, in ‡ation, and the nominal interest rate for each of our three estimated structural models over each sample period. The decomposition is conducted at horizons of 1, 4, 8, 12, 20 , and 40 quarters, and in the limit as the forecast horizon approaches in…nity. Note that the columns may not sum to 100 due to rounding errors.
Variance Decompositions
The results from the variance decompositions are quite similar across the models. Monetary policy shocks have their largest impact on output in the short and medium runs, whereas technology and aggregate demand shocks have their largest impact on output at medium and long horizons. Generally, technology shocks are more important at business-cycle frequencies in the late sample than in the early sample, whereas monetary policy shocks are more important at those frequencies in the early sample than in the late sample. These results suggest that improved control of monetary policy contributed relatively more to the "Great Moderation"than did the reduction in the variance of technology shocks.
Aggregate demand shocks have a much di¤erent e¤ect on output variability in the early sample than in the late sample. First, they account for a much smaller fraction of output variation, on average, in the late sample than in the early sample. Second, they tend to have their greatest impact at shorter horizons in the late sample than they do in the early sample.
Technology and aggregate demand shocks-not monetary policy shocks-are responsible for most of the variation in in ‡ation and the nominal interest rate. This result holds across models, across sample periods, and across time horizons. For in ‡ation, technology shocks are generally the biggest single source of variation. At medium and long horizons, though, aggregate demand shocks are often important, too. Finally, variations in the nominal interest rate are dominated by the aggregate demand shock at all horizons. Monetary policy shocks generally have little impact beyond the …rst few quarters. To begin, a positive technology shock produces an immediate decline in in ‡ation and a positive, hump-shaped output response in all three models and in both sample periods. Since in ‡ation falls but the real interest rate rises, the response of the nominal interest rate is ambiguous. In the early-sample period, the lower in ‡ation rate usually dominates so that the nominal interest rate falls. The higher real interest rate, however, dominates in the late-sample period, which pushes up the nominal interest rate.
Impulse Response Functions
The response to an aggregate demand shock is similar across sample periods. Speci…cally, a positive aggregate demand shock increases current consumption at the expense of savings. That decline in savings raises both the nominal and real interest rates. The increased consumption demand initially pushes up output. Output eventually declines, however, because the resources diverted away from investment lower the capital stock, reducing the economy's productive capacity. The increased demand for goods also puts upward pressure on the in ‡ation rate. In ‡ation follows a hump-shaped path in the dynamic indexation and sticky information models, but peaks on impact in the static indexation model.
Our models'predicted responses to a stimulative monetary policy shock exhibit several di¢ culties that are common in the DSGE literature. For example, all of the models fail to produce the hump-shaped output response observed in the data, and only the dynamic indexation model can generate an in ‡ation response that peaks several periods after the shock. 24 These di¢ culties can be mitigated by introducing a richer set of real rigidities and learning into the models. 25 As for the nominal interest rate, it falls on impact, but its response in subsequent periods varies from model to model. With static indexation, output declines rapidly after its initial upward jump so that the monetary authority keeps the nominal interest rate low. Output remains elevated for longer in the dynamic indexation model, which puts upward pressure on in ‡ation. The monetary authority reacts to the high and rising in ‡ation by promptly raising the nominal interest rate. In the sticky information model, the nominal interest rate response depends on the sample period. The increase in in ‡ation is large enough in the early sample period to push up the nominal interest rate with a one-period lag. That jump in in ‡ation, however, is more modest in the late sample period so that the nominal interest rate declines.
Summary and Suggestions for Future Research
None of the models with nominal frictions that we examine-sticky prices and wages with static indexation, sticky prices and wages with dynamic indexation, or stickyinformation prices and wages-performs consistently well over the entire post-World-War-II period. During an early sample, when aggregate in ‡ation was both persistent and highly variable, the dynamic indexation model performs substantially better than the alternatives. In a late sample, the static indexation model and the sticky information model perform about equally well, and both …t the data better than the dynamic indexation model. Our results highlight the possibility that some popular models of price and wage adjustment are not "structural," because they do not endogenously respond to economic and policy changes. Macroeconomic analyses based on such models then ought to be considered as approximations which are valid only in relatively stable economic and policy environments.
Future research might proceed in two directions. One approach is to examine how a …rm's preferred price-setting behavior varies in response to changes in the economic environment and the conduct of policy, while assuming that other …rms also are optimally setting their prices. That is, carefully model the endogeneity of nominal frictions so that we can examine the circumstances under which one pricing speci…cation is likely to be preferred to the alternatives. In this vein, Cogley and Sbordone (2008) show that if the permanent component of in ‡ation is identi…able, then price reoptimizing …rms will systematically put greater weight on future economic conditions as trend in ‡ation rises. Consequently, the coe¢ cients in the New Keynesian Phillips curve vary endogenously with trend in ‡ation. 26 Once Cogley and Sbordone (2008) take into account these shifting weights, they …nd no evidence of dynamic indexation in the data: Firms appear to hold their prices constant between reoptimizations. Cogley and Sbordone (2008) do not examine the subsample stability of their results.
The second avenue for future research is to develop a model of nominal frictions that is ‡exible enough to perform well over a wide range of circumstances. For example, Ireland (2007) estimates a DSGE model in which …rms can index to a weighted average of lagged in ‡ation and the monetary authority's time-varying target in ‡ation rate. His empirical results indicate that …rms completely index to the in ‡ation rate target and place zero weight on lagged in ‡ation. 27 Thus, …rms may be even more sophisticated in their pricing than is allowed for by the static indexation, dynamic indexation, and sticky information models. 
